Veterinary Non-Competes in Alabama

Section 8-1-190(a) starts from a default of voiding any contract that restrains someone from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business.

Subsection (b) then lists six named exceptions that are 'allowed to preserve a protectable interest': key-employee no-hire agreements, mutual-dealing agreements between businesses, sale-of-goodwill covenants, ordinary employee non-competes, customer non-solicitation covenants, and dissolution agreements among partners or members.

For an associate veterinarian's ordinary employment agreement, the exception most likely to apply is the employee non-compete in (b)(4) — an agreement not to carry on a similar business in a specified area for as long as the employer carries on a like business there, with restraints of two years or less presumed reasonable.

Those presumptions are rebuttable, not automatic: the statute's text does not spell out how a party overcomes one.

A separate common-law professional exemption may also bear on a veterinarian's covenant; see below.

Alabama has not enacted a statute limiting non-competes specifically for licensed healthcare practitioners.

The six exceptions in § 8-1-190(b) are written around categories of contract — sale of goodwill, ordinary employment, customer non-solicitation, dissolution — not around any licensed profession, and none of them mentions veterinarians, physicians, or healthcare practitioners at all.

That does not mean nothing outside § 8-1-190 could apply: Friddle v.

Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1991), held veterinarians to be 'professionals' for purposes of a separate common-law professional exemption.

The research behind this page did not re-read that decision directly this pass, so this page names it without describing its reach — see the final section below.

Alabama's statute ties no exception to how much the veterinarian earns.

Instead, each category of covenant in (b) carries its own presumptive duration: a sale-of-goodwill covenant is presumed reasonable at one year or less, an ordinary employee non-compete at two years or less, and a customer non-solicitation covenant at 18 months or the length of post-separation pay, whichever is greater.

These are described as presumptions the statute itself sets, not caps that automatically void anything longer — the text does not say what happens once a restraint exceeds the presumptive period.

A veterinarian selling a practice's goodwill — as opposed to signing an employment agreement — falls under a separate exception from the ordinary employee non-compete.

Section 8-1-190(b)(3) lets the seller agree not to compete with the buyer, and not to solicit the business's customers, within a specified geographic area for as long as the buyer (or anyone who takes title to that goodwill) keeps running a like business there.

A restraint of one year or less is presumed reasonable, a shorter presumptive window than the two years presumed reasonable for an ordinary employee covenant under (b)(4).

A separate exception, (b)(6), covers partners, owners, or members who agree, upon or in anticipation of dissolving a commercial entity, not to carry on a similar activity in the area where the business operated.

Which exception governs a specific buy-in or buy-out depends on how that agreement is structured.

Alabama's statute treats a covenant not to solicit current customers as a distinct exception from a covenant not to compete outright.

Section 8-1-190(b)(5) covers an employee's agreement not to solicit the employer's current customers, for as long as the employer carries on a like business, subject to reasonable time restraints.

It presumes 18 months reasonable, or — if longer — the length of time the employer keeps paying the employee after separation.

That means a departing associate's exposure on a pure non-solicitation clause can track how long any post-separation pay lasts, not just a flat 18-month figure.

The verbatim text of § 8-1-190 read for this page does not say how an Alabama court modifies or blue-pencils a covenant found overbroad — that procedural question is left open by the statute's own words.

Separately, Friddle v.

Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1991), recognized veterinarians as 'professionals' for purposes of a common-law professional exemption distinct from § 8-1-190 itself; the research behind this page did not re-read that decision directly this pass, so this page names it rather than describing its reach.

Both gaps matter most to a veterinarian actually weighing a specific covenant, which is exactly the reason to take the agreement to an Alabama attorney rather than rely on this page alone.